In the summer of 1992 I participated in an expedition to survey and photograpli Japanese and American warships that sank during the devastating battle of Guadalcanal, in 1942. The project was sponsored by the U.S. Navy and National Geographic. Using modern submarines to discover sunken naval vessels of a halfcentury ago overlaid modern and historical technology; the machines of today observed the failed machines of the past in the strange and alien world of the deep ocean. Travel to the ocean's depths produces its own metaphoric associations, and as such it provides a unique way of remembering modern industrial and technological warfare and the terrain over which it sought mastery. A techno-mythical narrative may be a necessary means to explore a past that is itself increasingly techno-mythical.
staging the Battle The island of Guadalcanal is over a hundred miles long and thirty miles wide, but only a small portion of it, toward the northeast corner, was disputeci terrain during the World War 11. Like many islands in the South Pacific, Guadalcanal was volcanicly formed, its only exceptional feature a small shelf, a few miles wide, between the mountains and the ocean. In 1942 this shelf represented the only suitable topography for a major airfield in this part of the South Pacific.
On August 7, 1942, an amphibious division of U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal and captured its airport from the Japanese, renaming it Henderson Field in honor of a fallen Marine. The Japanese had been slow to realize the airport's strategic importance and the Marines faced only light resistance from the small Japanese construction battalion which was still completing the runway. For the first few days after the August 7 landing, American transports unloaded supplies and equipment for the Marines to hold the airport. The Japanese had been taken by surprise by the invasion; as time went on they became ever more determined to recapture the airfield from the still small American force. As each side attempted to resupply and to protect their isolated troops fighting for control of Henderson Field, the area around Guadalcanal was the site of the most concentrated series of naval battles in history. Formerly known as Indispensable Strait, the waterway was renamed Iron Bottom Sound after nearly forty warships sank there in 1942 and early 1943.
The two forces had prepared to fight the war in different ways, largely because of the different technologies they possessed and the manner in which they were employed. As a result of interwar treaty limitations, the Japanese had fewer ships than the Americans. To make up for this weakness the Japanese trained specially in night-fighting at sea. The Allies, with more and larger ships, worked from a different doctrine, emphasizing long-range engagements in dayhght, so they were unprepared for battle in darkness. Shortly after 1 AM on August 9, a Japanese flotilla of seven cruisers and one destroyer entered Iron Bottom Sound from the Northwest, using Savo Island and its cloud cover to hide from the Allied patrol. Savo Island, actually a small valcono, protrudes steeply up two thousand feet straight out of the ocean. The cone looms as an ominous presence over Iron Bottom Sound. The Japanese force remained undetected until they rounded the island, achieving nearly complete surprise of the Allied force. Their blindness was partly due to their dependence on technology, relying on innovations which were not completely effective when they were new. Historian Richard Frank writes:
Ships of the [Japanese] Imperial Navy detected their opponents by visual means before radar discovered their presence. The primitive radar in use at this time suffered drastic reduction of already limited detection ranges because of echoes from landmasses, a phenomenon not well understood by Allied commanders, who were apt to repose excessive confidence in their electronic eyes.'
The Japanese improved existing methods, concentrating on their strength in optics and training. "By contrast, the Japanese sought and achieved maximum performance from optics by utilizing specially selected kiokouts equipped with outsized binoculars.'" The Japanese came out of the night at high speed, decimated the Allied ships, and disappeared around Savo Island heading North as quickly as they had appeared.
Occupying less than two hours from beginning to end. The Battle of Savo Island was the worst defeat for the U.S. Navy since Pearl Harbor, nearly a year before. The Allies lost seven ships, including four cruisers, with a total of 1077 men killed. Fortunately, the Japanese did not decide to pursue the vulnerable transports still unloading their gear The next morning, however. Marines on Guadalcanal, with less than twenty percent of their supplies unloaded, watched as the transports, deprived of protection, withdrew with the remainder of the equipment. The defeat at Savo Island left the Marines stranded and unequipped to defend the island airbase that the Japanese desperately wanted back.
Astoria Found and Lost
Now, nearly fifty years later to the day, our expedition is heading to a wreck that we think will be the Astoria, an American heavy cruiser that sank at Savo Island. Astoria's crew had been caught unaware and unprepared, and wasted several crucial minutes in the confusion of night battle at sea. Its airplane hangar had been set afire by a shell, and the flame invited shots from four enemy ships. Astoria was abandoned and sank at about noon on August 9. Our shipboard naval historian connects the circumstances of the Astoria's sinking with the current target.
It is 4;30 AM as the Laney Chouest heads toward the estimated target location.
We are working in the Scorpio "control van," a trailer-sized shipping container welded to the aft deck of the Lane]/ Chouest. Racks of video monitors, sonar equipment, and plotting stations crowd a windowless, air-conditioned laboratory. A team of four navy petty officers operate the vehicle; the pilot "flies" Scorpio with a joystick and controls its engineering systems; a sonar operator tracks the bottom and scans ahead for approaching objects, a critical function as the visibility through the video cameras is usually less than twenty feet; a navigator tracks the location of the vehicle in three dimensions using a separate sonar system, and keeps in constant touch with the bridge to direct ship movements; a navy watch leader directs the entire operation, taking direction from the historian and commanding and coordinating the other three operators. All concentrate on a set of video monitors presenting images from the cameras on the Scorpio, nearly a half mile below.
The historian has collected information on the ships which we expect to find, including drawings, photographs, battle reports, and various reported positions of sinking. The geographic importance of Savo Island is underscored by the fact that many sighted locations, from both sides, are given as a range and bearing from the volcano. Once a wreck is found the historian directs Scorpiio's crew toward those features which will yield positive identification. Sometimes the definitive clue is provided by the ship's architecture and armanents, such as 'Wn\^t he number of gun turrets, or the shape of a smokestack. Some of these ships were of the same design, however, and in these cases the distinguishing features are more subtle, such as a particular radio beacon or a gun added to one ship and not another. Ship recognition is not a modern science, and the task we are performing parallels that of the lookouts themselves on the night of the battle, trying to asses enemy forces, determining friend from foe at long distances with poor visibility. It is an act of reading, taking incomplete clues from imperfect sources and drawing a conclusion, assigning a name to a thing. It has been four hours of transit from a previous wreck site. We review the historical data and what we expect to see. The historian pastes a drawing of Astoria on the wall.
A New Orleans Class heavy cruiser, Asforin was 580 feet long and displaced just under 10,000 tons. Its main armaments were three turrets of three eight-inch guns each, two forward and one aft. Just behind the bridge were two catapults for launching float planes and a hanger for storing the aircraft. The bridge has a sleek, almost Art Deco look, and its heavy armor gives it the appearance of a blockhouse rising above the deck. Astorin sustained a large number of hits before it sank, and is probably not in particularly good condition. There should be an exit hole from a torpedo hit under the forward capstan. The five-inch gun on the stern should be aimed aft and to port. A major shell hit was reported in the bow turret.
The ROV's sonar sends out an acoustic pulse, and its echoes, if they bounce off a target, return and sound through a loudspeaker and display on a screen with a rotating beam that looks very much like a radar set. (The terminology of the sonar "target" is by no coincidence the same as that used for aiming a gun; the technology we are using to explore these wrecks is a distant but direct descendent of that aboard the sunken warships themselves.) With no target, you hear mostly crackling noise, from small objects and rocks or electrical noise in the tether cable. These sounds, as they bounce around and echo, give one a feeling for the vast empty space below the surface, rather like a huge dark gymnasium. Now we hear a smooth, continuous tone. 1 We have founci our target, and it sounds as though the steel hull of a ship were itself reverberating. The tone increases in pitch as we approach. The sonar screen displays a large, distinctly ship-like shape. "Very large contact, dead ahead!" calls out the sonar operator. We are thirty yards away. Now Scorpio begins to close in on the wreck. The sonar tracks the vehicle at forty tcet, then thirty, then twenty. Still nothing in the video camera. Finally, at a range of ten feet. a shape emerges out of the darkness. Its straight hnes reveal it to be man-made, not sea floor or rock formation. The object is clearly large enough to be a ship, but what part of a ship? Which way does it lie? Are we looking at the side or the bottom? We cannot assume it lies upright, though most ships below a certain depth tend to right themselves on the way down. We find the corner of the deck; this wreck does indeed lie upright. We are most likely looking at the hull, and in the past few days we have developed some skill at orienting ourselves. First we rise, following up the hull until we see the corner of the deck. Then we travel along the edge one way or the other until reaching either the bow or the stern. Trouble is, many of these ships do not have a bow or a stern anymore, their hulls having been shot away or broken when they hit bottom.
Worse, a hull bent at a right angle presents a danger, because the ROV's video camera has a very limited viewing angle. While traveling sideways fore and along the beam of the ship, we could find ourselves entangled from the side in unseen debris.
The historian shows the pilot a photograph of the Astoria, pointing out the features along the deckline we would expect to see.
Toward the stern a big slab of steel should rise flush with the deck, the hangar for storing the cruiser's airplanes. We see a shape that could be an anchor, suggesting we are at the bow. But gradually, an undercut takes shape in the hull below the deck: Scorpio is approaching the stern. This slope becomes more pronounced, until we can say with certainty we are at the stern. The historian remarks, "I've got a sinking feeling that this wreck is not as big as we think and that it is a Japanese destroyer. This is simply not a cruiser stern." The sonar image of this wreck taken last year made it appear 450 feet long, definitely cruiser size. But, as we have found during the previous week, sonar measurements can be misleading, affected by everything from the speed of sound in water to the settings on the chart recorder.
The pilot brings Scorpio in closer, and we begin to see more details. A set of cables dangles just below the deckline. The historian recognizes them as degaussing cables. used to neutralize the ship's magnetic field to keep it from setting off mines. On American ships, however, degaussing cables were inside the hull, and these go around the outside, which was how the Japanese built them. Similarly, we notice gear for handling a paravane, a device dangled below and away from the hull of a ship to protect it from torpedoes. By the 1930s, only the Japanese were using this technology. We look closely one last time at the photograph of Astorin, the stern is large, with a marked shape different from what we are now seeing. This wreck is not Astoria.
We are a bit disappointed not to find what we expected. But now we have an unknown, and the challenge is fresh. We travel camera. Another historian, who reads Japanese, comes in the van. We move back to the stern and show him the Japanese character painted on it. It is the Japanese equivalent of "A." Astoria remains lost. We have found Ayanami.
Geography and History
Exploring the battles in Guadalcanal maps geography onto history, or perhaps history onto geography. In either case, the two were forcibly brought together by this event. We see this first in the name Guadalcanal itself. Originally, Guadalcanal was a place, but now it is the name of a battle, or a series of battles: a campaign. In twentieth century American history "Guadalcanal" is inextricably linked to the events of 1942. The word itself seems strangely evocative, as if the canal refers to a specific artifact, a feat of military engineering over which a battle was fought. In reality, the battle had nothing to do with a canal. The name Guadalcanal has its own colonial history, given to the site by the explorer Mendana in memory of his home town in Spain.T he Battle of Savo Island also illustrates on a smaller scale the intermingling of geography and history through the naming of an event. One particular battle, that of August ninth, was named after the island, probably because it was the first to occur in this area, and also because the island itself played a critical role, hiding the Japanese attackers from the unsuspecting Allies. So the battle takes place on the island, and therefore inherits its name. As time passes, however, the process of representation reverses, and the ominous loom of the island comes to connote the disastrous memory of the battle, and even to stand for it as a kind of natural memorial. Maps of the Solomon Islands are replete with the names was fought on the surface a mile or two above. But in sea battles the place does not record the event the same way it does for land battles. The battlefield of naval warfare is the ships themselves, where people experience combat.
The floor of Iron Bottom Sound is a surface projection of the "battlefield," the ships having undergone a transformation during the descent to their final resting place. Seeing this place, we seek to equate the site with the event, as we did with Savo Island. But Savo Island, though a living volcano, is a more fixed topographic reality, retaining physical qualities that link it directly to the battle as a landmark. Not only does the sea floor lack such qualities, but its own characteristics-the absolute darkness, the nearfreezing cold, and the utter inaccessibility to all but complex machines-are not related to the events of the battle. When we explore the wrecks, however, the space of the bottom of the ocean feeds back on the memory of war, lending its dreamlike qualities to the events of the past. Individually or collectively, we cast the images of wrecks in deep water into the mold of the battle, and the physical qualities of the ocean floor become metaphors that help us imagine history. In this way, the deep sea becomes a dense fluid monument. The bottom of the ocean further complicates the idea of place and its representation by names in history. Indispensable Strait was renamed Iron Bottom Sound after the war, in memory of the ships resting there. But the bottom itself, where these ships actually lay, has no name. It has been, in effect, unspeakable, because, up until now, it has been unknown. Now, with our submarines and our cameras, we are in this place: we see it and bring it into being. It is the stage of our drama, the field of our work. And a field it is. Often during our expedition this place was referred to as a battlefield, or more precisely, an "underwater battlefielci." This term exemplifies the overall complexity of representing Guadalcanal underwater. This space is not a battlefield: the battle 
